Aggregate Demand, Functional Finance and Secular Stagnation by Skott, Peter
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2016
Aggregate Demand, Functional Finance and
Secular Stagnation
Peter Skott
University of Massachusetts, Amherst, pskott@econs.umass.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Skott, Peter, "Aggregate Demand, Functional Finance and Secular Stagnation" (2016). Economics Department Working Paper Series. 201.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/201
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
Working Paper
Aggregate Demand, Functional Finance
and Secular Stagnation
by
Peter Skott
Working Paper 2016-02
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
Aggregate demand, functional nance and
secular stagnation
Peter Skotty
February 3, 2016
Abstract
This paper makes three main points. Fiscal policy, rst, may be needed
in the long run to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation.
If scal policy is used in this way, second, the long-run debt ratio depends
(i) inversely on the rate of growth, (ii) inversely on government consump-
tion, and (iii) directly on the degree of inequality. The analysis, third,
suggests that policies and policy debates have been misguided. The re-
cent rediscovery of secular stagnation by Summers and others should be
welcomed, but the suggested theoretical redirection is unclear and does
not go far enough.
JEL classication: E62, E22
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nance, zero lower bound, liquidity trap, scal
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1 Introduction
This paper makes three main points. Fiscal policy, rst, may be needed in the
long run to maintain full employment and avoid secular stagnation. If scal
policy is used in this way, second, the long-run debt ratio depends (i) inversely
on the rate of growth, (ii) inversely on government consumption, and (iii) di-
rectly on the degree of inequality. The analysis, third, suggests that policies and
policy debates have been misguided. The recent rediscovery of secular stagna-
tion by Summers and others should be welcomed, but the suggested theoretical
redirection is unclear and does not go far enough.
Throughout the paper, the analysis will be conned to closed economies,
and it will be assumed that public debt is denominated in a currency that is
controlled by the central bank. In economies of this kind the government can
Paper presented at the 19th FMM Conference, "The Spectre of Stagnation  Europe in
the World Economy", Berlin 22 October 2015. The paper draws on material from Ryoo and
Skott (2013, 2015), Skott and Ryoo (2014, 2015) and Skott (2016).
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never be forced to default on its debt obligations. The situation is fundamen-
tally di¤erent for an open economy with debt denominated in foreign currency.
The importance of this simple distinction, surprisingly, does not seem to be uni-
versally recognized. Collard et al. (2015), for instance, calculate sustainable
public debt ratios using the same criteria for the US and Greece; Reinhart and
Rogo¤ (2010) make no distinctions among countries based on the denomination
of the public debt; the popular press has been full of references to Greece as a
cautionary tale for what could happen to the US if public debt is not reined in.
The closed economy assumption means that the analysis is not directly ap-
plicable to a country like Greece. But indirectly the analysis is highly relevant.
Policy analysis should not focus narrowly on the options for Greece, taking as
given the international environment in which it operates. An analysis of this
kind might show austerity in some form to be the only viable option. The same
conclusion might follow from the analysis of, say, Portugal or Ireland, each seen
in isolation and taking their international environment as given. But auster-
ity policies cannot be justied in this way for the Eurozone as a whole. Small
open economy models are intrinsically partial and subject to the same fallacy
of composition problems as other partial models, including the quintessential
Keynesian examples.1 The Eurozone controls its own currency and, less impor-
tantly, most of the international trade of the Eurozone countries is with other
countries within the zone. Models of a closed economy with debt in its own
currency can provide essential tools for an analysis of what could and should be
done in the Eurozone as a whole.
The analysis is subject to a second domain assumption. The focus is on
mature economies. Post-Keynesian models often consider a dual economy with
a perfectly elastic supply of labor. These models may be relevant for economies
with large amounts of (open or hidden) un- and underemployment in which the
growth rate can be determined without any reference to the labor market. In
a mature economy, by contrast, the labor supply is not perfectly elastic. For
simplicity I shall take the full-employment growth rate as exogenously given, but
the analysis could be extended to allow endogeneity in the growth rate.2 For
present purposes the important distinction between dual and mature economies
is the existence in the latter of a well-dened target value for the full-employment
growth rate. This mature-economy assumption, in my view, provides a better
starting point for the analysis of advanced economies like the US, Japan or most
of Europe than the alternative dual economy assumption.
Section 2 presents some simple algebra. The algebra leaves a degree of free-
dom, and theory is needed to close the model. Section 3 discusses a mainstream
closure, and section 4 turns to a Keynesian, functional-nance perspective. Sec-
tion 5 outlines some implications of functional nance. Section 6 discusses
1An individual worker may be able to nd work by accepting a low wage just as an indi-
vidual household may raise its saving by reducing consumption. But this does not imply that
reductions in the money wages for all workers will also raise aggregate employment or that a
reduction is aggregate consumption raises aggregate saving.
2The natural growth rate  the growth in the labor supply in e¢ciency units  could depend
on the employment rate (e.g. Flaschel and Skott 2006)
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secular stagnation. I briey consider the Japanese case  which has gured
prominently in these discussions  before commenting on the recent rediscovery
by Summers and others of secular stagnation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Some simple algebra
The nature of the long-run demand issue can be highlighted by a few, well-
known equations. The rst equation is the equilibrium condition for the goods
market in a closed economy,
Y
K
=
C
K
+
I
K
+
G
K
(1)
The familiar Y = C + I +G equation has been divided through by the capital
stock; this is just a convenient normalization when dealing with long-run growth.
The ratio of government consumption to the capital stock is taken to be
exogenous,
G
K
=  (2)
The value of the government consumption ratio is contentious. How much should
we spend on public education or public health care, for instance? For present
purposes, however, debates on the appropriate size of the public sector are
largely irrelevant. The main questions that I want to explore relate to the prin-
ciple of functional nance, and these questions can be addressed independently
of the precise level of the government consumption ratio.3
The third equation represents straightforward accounting. In order to main-
tain full-employment growth and a constant output capital ratio, the ratio of
gross investment to the capital stock must be equal to the sum of the growth
rate of the labor supply (n) and the rate of depreciation () :
I
K
= n+  (3)
By denition the output capital ratio is constant in steady growth, but the
steady-growth value may be endogenous. Mainstream theory typically assumes
a smooth production function with substitutability between capital and labor.
This assumption may be heroic, but it is also restrictive to ignore the choice
of technique. Hence, I shall allow for a dependence of the output capital ratio
() on the cost of nance and, for simplicity, the cost of nance is taken to be
3There is undoubtedly a positive correlation between support for public consumption and
support for an active scal policy along the lines of functional nance, but that is a di¤erent
issue.
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determined by the real rate of interest.4 Formally,
 =
Y
K
= f(r) (4)
Equation (4) reects two assumptions: the possible inuence of the interest rate
on the choice of technique and, second, the assumption that the utilization of
capital is at the desired rate in steady growth.5
Combining equations (1)-(4), the condition for steady growth with full em-
ployment can be written as
  
C
K
= f(r) 
C
K
=  + n+  (5)
The variables on the right-hand side of (5) are exogenous, and any adjustment
has to come through either the output capital ratio (the real rate of interest) or
the consumption-capital ratio. The question is, will these adjustments happen
automatically or is there a need for active policy? If the adjustment occurs
automatically via changes in interest rates and the output capital ratio, one can
ask whether these changes lead to a capital intensity that is socially optimal
in some sense. If the adjustment does not come via the choice of technique,
the consumption ratio must do the adjusting, and we need to examine the
determination of this ratio. In particular, is policy intervention needed to a¤ect
the consumption ratio and if so, what kind of policy should be used?
Before proceeding, it may be useful to consider some possible Kaleckian and
Sra¢an objections to the way I am posing the questions. Kaleckians may take
issue with the treatment of the utilization rate of capital; Sra¢ans may question
the treatment of the choice of technique.
Post-Keynesian models typically take the production function to be of the
Leontief type: there is no choice of technique. This assumption does not nec-
essarily mean that there is no endogeneity in the output capital ratio in these
models. In fact, Kaleckian models require accommodating variations in the
utilization rate of capital, not just in the short run (which is uncontroversial)
but also across di¤erent steady growth paths. The large long-run variations
envisaged by these models are at odds with the evidence and also, I believe,
hard to defend behaviorally.6 The analysis in this paper therefore assumes that
the utilization rate will be equal to the desired rate in steady growth. This
assumption is in line with both classical and Harrodian approaches to economic
4There are two factor prices: the cost of nance and the wage. The cost of nance is taken
to be fullly determined by the interest rate; the real wage is determined by the markup and
the productivity of labor. Combining the rst order condition from the choice of technique
with a markup-determined real wage, the choice of technique can be expressed as a function
of r: See Skott (1989, chapter 5) or Skott and Ryoo (2015) for details.
5The specication allows for a possible dependence of the desired utilization rate on the
interest rate (Skott 1989, Ryoo and Skott 2015).
6The objections are spelled out in greater detail in Skott (2012) and Skott and Zipperer
(2012); a Kaleckian position is presented, inter alia, by Lavoie (1995), Dutt (1997), Dallery
and van Treeck (2011), and Hein et al. (2012).
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growth.7
Objections to my treatment of the choice of technique may point to the cap-
ital controversy. The controversy highlighted the di¢culties of constructing an
aggregate production function and demonstrated, in particular, how reswitching
and capital reversals may undermine economic theories that rely on movements
along a smooth production function. But these insights from the capital contro-
versy do not imply that only one technique is available; nor do they invalidate
the inuence of the cost of nance on the choice of technique.
The key question is not the existence of a choice of technique; it is whether
the output capital ratio will adjust automatically to ensure continuous full em-
ployment. It is this automatic adjustment in Solow-type models that is ques-
tionable.8 It is questionable for several reasons. The scope for capital-labor
substitution is limited in the short run; neighboring techniques in terms of cap-
ital intensity may di¤er widely in terms of the specic, disaggregated capital
goods that they use; a fall in the cost of nance may lead to a perverse re-
duction in the aggregate capital intensity (the famous case of capital reversing).
But perhaps most importantly, when rms choose the capital intensity of the
productive capacity generated by new investment, the choice is guided by rel-
ative input prices. If these relative input prices fail to clear the labor market,
the choice of technique will be determined by the wrong prices.9
Returning to the choice of technique as described by equation (4), a main-
stream story with smooth and well-behaved substitution has f 0 > 0; the capital
controversy raised questions about the smoothness of the f -function and showed
that even if the f -function is di¤erentiable, we may have f 0 < 0; a Leontief
production function without any choice of technique corresponds to the special
case with f 0  0: The di¤erences between the three cases can be critical for
the adjustment process towards a steady growth path. As a characterization of
steady growth paths, however, the general expression in (4) is consistent with
all three cases.
7Harrodian instability issues will not be considered in this paper. The paper examines
policy requirements for sustaining aggregate demand at the full-employment trajectory, as-
suming that the capital stock grows at the natural rate. Franke (2015) and Ryoo and Skott
(2015) analyze economic policy in economies with Harrodian instability.
8 In Joan Robinsons words,
"The long wrangle about measuring capital has been a great deal of fuss over
a secondary question. The real source of trouble is the confusion between com-
parisons of equilibrium positions and the history of a process of accumulation."
(Robinson,1974, p. 9)
9The lack of stability of full employment, not a rejection of the existence of a full em-
ployment equililbrium, was the key message of Keyness analysis in the General Theory; the
lack of stability in turn was associated with a lack of automatic adjustments in factor prices
(chapter 19).
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3 Mainstream answers
The determination of the output capital ratio and the consumption ratio di¤ers
across theories. Mainstream macroeconomics suggests that aggregate demand
will adjust automatically and that the equilibrium condition (5) will be met
in the long run. The traditional Solow model relies exclusively on variations
in the output capital ratio to ensure that the condition (5) will be satised.
DSGE models with Ramsey optimization introduce an additional adjustment
mechanism.
In a Ramsey setting the growth in per capita consumption satises the Euler
condition
c^ =
1

(r   ) (6)
where  is the representative households discount rate and  the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution; r is the real rate of interest and c per capita consump-
tion; a hat over a variable denotes a rate of growth (x^ = _x=x = (dx=dt)=x):
The growth rate of per capita consumption is constant in steady growth, and
equation (6) implies the existence of a well-dened natural rate of interest:
r = +  (7)
where  is the rate of labor saving technical change. Given this unique natural
rate of interest, equation (4) determines the capital intensity. Using the rep-
resentative households utility function as the welfare criterion, moreover, the
Ramsey model implies that the growth path  including the capital intensity 
will be optimal in the absence of externalities or other market imperfections.10
Unlike in the Solow model with a xed saving rate, there is no danger of dy-
namic inconsistency; high saving rates will never take the capital intensity to
a level above the golden rule. In fact variations in capital intensity are not
even needed to ensure full-employment growth: the saving rate is an endoge-
nous variable, and if  is exogenously given (the Leontief case), the saving rate
(and thus C=K) will do all of the adjustment in equation (5).
In short, DSGE models based on Ramsey optimization give a clear answer.
Short-run problems associated with nominal stickiness may call for an active
monetary policy, but market adjustments in real wages and interest rates in
combination with the endogeneity of the saving rate serve to maintain full em-
ployment in the medium and long run. There is no need for either countercyclical
or long-run scal policy. This is fortunate since Ricardian equivalence makes
scal policy ine¤ectual in this setting: farsighted households adjust their saving
in response to changes in taxes. The main concern of scal policy becomes to
minimize tax distortions. If revenue cannot be raised exclusively through lump-
sum taxes and the costs of distortion are convex, this objective translates into
tax-smoothing (Barro 1979).
10Although widely praised as "correct" (Blanchard 2008, p. 9) or "natural" (Woodford 2003,
p. 12), there is nothing correct or natural about this approach. The use of the representative
agents utility function as the social welfare function implies a systematic and intrinsic bias
in favor of the rich (Skott and Davis 2013).
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The DSGE/Ramsey results have dominated mainstream thinking. They are
not robust, however. Relax the model by introducing nite lives, as in OLG
models without intergenerational altruism, and the optimality of the market
outcome disappears. Even with perfect optimization and continuous full em-
ployment, OLG models can produce dynamic ine¢ciency: the capital intensity
may be so high (and the return on capital so low) that all generations could be
made better o¤ by a reduction in saving. More generally, there is no presump-
tion that market solutions will be socially optimal in these models.
The denition of social welfare raises a host of issues but consider a simple
case without any intra-generational inequality. Intergenerational distribution
then becomes the only distributional issue, and the social discount rate will be
central to the determination of a socially optimal trajectory. In the absence of
discounting the optimal trajectory maximizes consumption per capita in steady
growth (the golden-rule); if the social welfare function calls for discounting fu-
ture consumption, the steady-growth value of the capital intensity will be below
the golden-rule level. Conditional on the normative choice of a discount rate, let
 and r be the socially optimal capital intensity and the associated interest
rate. Except by a uke, these values will be inconsistent with market clearing
in a neoclassical OLG model: the value of C=K (at  = ; r = r) will not
clear the goods market at full employment:
C
K
R       (n+ ) (8)
The nite horizons also bring a solution to the problem that they create:
the ine¤ectiveness of scal policy disappears when households have nite hori-
zons, even if one retains all other assumptions of rational behavior and perfect
foresight. Future taxes will be paid by di¤erent taxpayers, and there is no
Ricardian equivalence in the OLG model. Changes in current taxes therefore
inuence current consumption, and scal policy can be used to maintain full
employment and an optimal capital intensity. The ip side of these results is
that scal policy a¤ects the interest rate and the choice of technique. Putting
it di¤erently, unlike in models with Ramsey optimization, the natural rate of
interest  the interest rate associated with full employment  cannot be dened
independently of scal policy.
There is nothing new and radical about these propositions. Diamond (1965)
derived many of them formally for a neoclassical OLG model; see also Skott and
Ryoo (2014, 2015).
4 Functional nance
OLG models have many failings from a Keynesian perspective, but very similar
conclusions can be reached using more traditional Keynesian models.
Twenty two years before the Diamond model, Lerner (1943) had discussed
the principle of functional nance. Fiscal policy, he argued, is an essential
instrument of Keynesian policy, and it should be used "with an eye only to the
7
results of these actions on the economy and not to any established traditional
doctrine about what is sound or unsound" (p. 39; italics in original). According
to functional nance there is nothing virtuous about balancing the government
budget over any particular period. The public debt, likewise, is of no importance
in itself. Households may need to balance their budgets, but governments are
under no such compulsion, and doctrines of sound nance are based on a false
analogy.
Lerner spells out the implications of functional nance.11 Functional nance,
he argues,
"prescribes, rst, the adjustment of total spending (by everybody
in the economy, including the government) in order to eliminate
both unemployment and ination ... ; second, the adjustment of
public holdings of money and of government bonds, by government
borrowing or debt repayment, in order to achieve the rate of interest
which results in the most desirable level of investment; and, third,
the printing, hoarding or destruction of money as needed for carrying
out the rst two parts of the program." (Lerner 1943, p. 41)
The "most desirable level of investment" is typically taken as given in the short
run, and the extension of Lerners argument to the analysis of long-run growth
may need comment.
The change in the capital stock is given by the di¤erence between investment
and depreciation,
_K = I   K
A trajectory of desirable levels of investment therefore denes a trajectory of
desirable capital stocks. If full employment is being maintained along this tra-
jectory, we also have a trajectory for output. Thus, from a long-run perspective,
Lerners prescriptions for policies that produce full employment and desirable
levels of investment can be stated alternatively as prescriptions for policies that
produce a trajectory of full employment and desirable output capital ratios. The
output capital ratio in steady growth is determined by the choice of technique,
and we can now use the simple framework in the previous section: Lerners
investment argument translates into the requirement that the steady-growth
value of the interest rate satisfy the condition
r = f  1()
This requirement pins down the steady-growth value of the real interest rate,
and policy makers must turn to scal policy to adjust aggregate demand and
11A large Keynesian literature takes positions that are similar to functional nance (even if
not always directly inspired by Lerner); examples include Schlicht (2006), Godley and Lavoie
(2007), Arestis and Sawyer (2010), Davidson (2010), Palley 2010, and Nersisyan and Wray
(2010). .
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maintain full employment.12 13 We have taken government consumption as
exogenous, but taxes and transfers can be used to a¤ect consumption.14
Functional nance holds that intrinsically government decits and public
debt are neither good nor bad. Even from a functional nance perspective,
however, the level of debt is not irrelevant. High debt may not be morally
wrong, and there may be no risk that the government becomes unable to pay
back the debt, but the level of debt can have implications for the distribution
of income and for the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy; Taylor rules that are
stabilizing for low debt ratios can become destabilizing if the debt ratio exceeds
a certain threshold (Ryoo and Skott 2015). Added to this, the possibility that
public debt could become unsustainable has been a recurrent theme in policy
debates. Thus, it may be interesting to examine the implications of functional
nances for the time path of public debt.
The change in public debt given by
_B = rB +G  T (9)
and under functional nance, the policy makers adjust T to maintain full em-
ployment growth. The required adjustments in taxes depend on the precise
specication of consumption. For present purposes, I shall simply assume that
consumption is a linear function of income and wealth, and that household
wealth is the sum of xed capital and the stock of government bonds. Formally,
C = c(Y + rB   T ) + (K +B) (10)
where T and B are taxes and government debt; the positive parameters c and 
describe the propensity to consume out of current disposable income and wealth.
As shown in appendix A, equations (5), (10) and (9) produce a di¤erential
equation for the debt to capital ratio, b = B=K:
_b =
1
c
[(1  c)(   )    n  ]  (n+

c
)b
The negative feedback from the level of the debt ratio to the change in the debt
ratio implies that the stationary solution is stable. The intuition is simple. An
increase in public debt raises both private disposable income (for given T ) and
private wealth. Both of these e¤ects stimulate consumption, and policy makers
need to raise taxes in order to prevent overheating and ination.
12 In the Leontief case without a choice of technique, the interest rate has no e¤ect on the
right hand side of equation (8), and the interest rate can be set to satisfy some other objective
(to a¤ect the share of income going to rentiers, for instance). The underlying determinants of

 and r is irrelevant for the subsequent analysis of the scal policy requirements.
13This determination of the steady-growth value of the interest rate does not preclude short-
run variations in the interest rate around its steady-growth value for stabilization purposes;
Franke (2015), Ryoo and Skott (2015).
14The exogeneity of government consumption (and the taxes) is a reasonable assumption for
the long run. Variations in government consumption around the exogenous long-run trajectory
may be a better tool for short-run stabilization, however (Ryoo and Skott 2015).
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Stability implies that the debt ratio converges to the stationary solution,
b! b =
(1  c)(   )    n  
nc+ 
(11)
5 Implications
Growth e¤ects It follows from equation (11) that the steady-growth value of
the debt ratio depends inversely on the natural growth rate n: This implication
of the model has direct relevance for the interpretation of observed correlations
between debt and growth.
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2010, p. 575) famously argued that debt to GDP
ratios above 90 percent mean levels of growth almost 4 percent lower. Their
evidence turned out to be based on spreadsheet errors and curious weighting
procedures (Herndon et al. 2014). The sharp threshold disappears when these
errors are corrected, but the data still appear to show a negative correlation
between growth and debt. The implications of this correlation are far from
obvious. The correlation could be entirely spurious, and if there are causal
links, the causation could go either way or both ways.
The evidence from short-run patterns suggests causality from growth to debt
(Ash et al. 2015). This result may not be surprising: tax revenues drop when
growth falters, leading to rising debt. The more interesting question concerns
the links between growth and debt in the long run, and a purely empirical
analysis is unlikely to shed much light on this long-run question. The model
in section 4 contributes a theoretical perspective. It shows that scal policies
which maintain full employment produce a long-run causal link from low growth
rates to high debt ratios: low growth leads to high debt. Intuitively, a higher
growth rate implies that the share of investment in output must rise and that
consumption must be squeezed. This squeeze is achieved by raising taxes, and
higher taxes reduce the long-run debt ratio.
The growth rate was taken to be exogenous in section 4, and causality runs
unambiguously from growth to debt. The exogeneity assumption can be chal-
lenged, and causality could run both ways; the presence of a causal link from
growth to debt does not preclude a reverse link from debt to growth. Several
mechanisms have been suggested (see, e.g. the survey in Elmendorf and Mankiw
1999).
One set of arguments rely on crowding out and an increase in interest rates.
The evidence does not, however, show a clear positive relation between the
public debt ratio and interest rates. The US has seen large variations in the
debt ratio but the correlation with interest rates is, if anything, negative. This
lack of support for crowding out is conrmed by more detailed studies. In the
words of Engen and Hubbard (2005, p.83), some economists believe there is
a signicant, large, positive e¤ect of government debt on interest rates, others
interpret the evidence as suggesting that there is no e¤ect on interest rates.
Distortionary taxation represents another possible source of negative causal
e¤ects from debt to economic growth. The broad evidence may not be kind
10
to this hypothesis; the US experienced its highest rates of sustained growth
during the high-tax years of the golden age. But leaving aside doubts about
the magnitude and relevance of any such e¤ects, the argument faces another
problem: an increase in the debt ratio need not be associated with a rise in the
tax rate. Both the long-run debt ratio and the long-run tax rate are endogenous
variables but as shown in Appendix B, the correlation between tax rate and debt
can be negative. Shifts in the consumption parameters c and , for instance,
will produce opposite movements in the long run values of the debt ratio and
the tax rates if r(1   

) < n: Thus, if tax rates have negative growth e¤ects,
high debt could be benecial.
Austerity In the short run, austerity leads to recession, and a fall in income
tends to raise the debt income ratio (Leao 2013). The analysis in section 4
shows that austerity policies may also be counterproductive on their own terms
in the long run (assuming that the aim is to reduce public debt and not just to
squeeze the public sector): the debt ratio in equation (11) depends inversely on
government consumption :
Schlicht (2006) derives this result for a model that is closely related to the
one in section 4, and the result is quite robust. Ryoo and Skott (2013) show that
it holds for a stock-ow consistent model of a corporate economy (an economy
in which household wealth takes the form of bonds and stocks rather than direct
ownership of xed capital). Skott and Ryoo (2014, 2015) consider neoclassical
and Keynesian OLG models and show that austerity in the form of cuts to social
security generate a rising debt ratio. Hysteresis e¤ects in the labor market could
reinforce these results. Like the analysis in section 4, the above papers take the
employment trajectory associated with full employment to be independent of
short-run uctuations in output. If austerity policies that cause a recession pro-
duce permanent (or very prolonged) negative e¤ects on the future employment
trajectory, the paradoxical long-run e¤ects of austerity on debt are magnied
(DeLong and Summers 2012).
Income distribution and saving The rich, on average, have a higher rate
of saving than the poor, and rising inequality tends to reduce the average rate of
consumption. A fall in consumption, however, must be o¤set by scal expansion
to prevent unemployment. The model in section 4 did not include income dis-
tribution explicitly, but equation (11) can be used to nd the derived e¤ects of
changes in household behavior on the debt ratio. Not surprisingly, the equation
shows that the debt ratio depends inversely on the consumption parameters c
and :
The distribution of income is important in its own right, and post-tax in-
equality can be a¤ected by the structure of taxation. Interestingly, the structure
of taxation also inuences the debt dynamics. The stability of the debt ratio
derives from two feedback e¤ects. An increase in debt raises consumption both
via the wealth e¤ect and because of the rise in interest payments associated
with an increase in debt. Functional nance calls for an increase in taxes to
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neutralize this stimulus to aggregate demand. If, as in section 4, all households
have the same consumption rate out of disposable income, the result is a stable
income dynamics.
Distribution e¤ects in combination with di¤erential saving rates can weaken
the magnitude of the required tax increase following a rise in debt: a small tax
increase on workers with a low saving rate may be su¢cient to o¤set the demand
e¤ect from interest payments that go to high-saving rentiers. If this happens
the increase in debt can lead to a rise in the decit, and the debt dynamics can
become explosive. The remedy is straightforward: use taxes on capital income
as the scal instrument, instead of taxes on wage income. The same reasoning
has another implication. Switching taxes towards capital income and the rich
will reduce the long run debt ratio in the stable case. Indeed, this conclusion
was anticipated by Lerner (1943, p. 49):
"if for any reason the government does not wish to see private prop-
erty grow too much (whether in the form of government bonds or
otherwise) it can check this by taxing the rich ... The rich will not
reduce their spending signicantly ... By this means the debt can
be reduced to any desired level and kept there."
6 Secular stagnation
Japan experienced 25 years of miracle growth in the post-war period. GDP per
capita grew at an astounding average annual rate of 8.2 percent between 1945
and 1970. The per capita growth rate dropped to 3.6 percent between 1970 and
1990, and the Japanese economy has stagnated since then. With average per
capita growth of only 0.8 percent between 1990 and 2014, Japan has become
the poster case for secular stagnation, and policy makers appear powerless.
Interest rates have hit the zero lower bound, and public debt has climbed to
about 250 percent of GDP. Simple as it is, the analysis in sections 4-5 can help
make sense of this pattern of growth and stagnation.
The Japanese economy was characterized by large amounts of hidden unem-
ployment and underemployment until the late 1960s. Throughout this period
the labor supply to the modern sector was highly elastic, and there was a large
potential for technological catchup. An elastic labor supply and a potential
for technological catchup do not ensure fast growth. In the absence of state
intervention  improvements in infrastructure and education along with suc-
cessful industrial strategies  the economy could have followed a very di¤erent,
slow-growth trajectory. But the elastic labor supply was important by permit-
ting fast growth, and fast growth (high accumulation rates) allowed the goods
market to be in equilibrium, despite high saving rates.
Labor constraints began to appear around 1970 as the economy approached
maturity. The growth rates of the previous period exceeded the natural rate
of growth, and a decline in the rate of growth was inevitable. But the growth
rate dropped below the natural rate. A combination of high saving rates and
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slow growth produced a structural liquidity trap: "the proximate problem of
the Japanese economy in the 1990s may be one of aggregate demand, but the
demand deciency is structural" (Nakatani and Skott 2007, p. 307).
With high saving rates, a low natural rate of growth and a reduced accumu-
lation potential, Japan needed other sources of aggregate demand. The nancial
and real estate bubble of the 1980s alleviated the demand problems for while,
but when the bubble burst, the public and foreign sectors would have had to
pick up the slack to maintain full employment. Political constraints excluded
large and sustained trade surpluses, and political constraints also restrained the
scal route. The result was limping growth with persistent underperformance,
weak labor markets and deationary tendencies.
Insu¢cient aggregate demand remains a problem. A more aggressive de-
mand policy is called for, and public debt should be allowed to rise. This does
not imply that ever-increasing debt will be required. The structural problems
have been loosened somewhat, partly as a result of the rise in debt that has
been allowed to take place. The debt may not be as high as it should have
been, had the authorities followed a pure functional nance approach, but scal
decits and a large debt have boosted demand. Other factors have helped too.
Demographic changes and an aging population have contributed to a fall in the
saving rate; the household saving rate out of net disposable income has declined
steeply from around 20 percent in the mid 1970s to about 2 percent in after
2010.
This broad story of the Japanese economy explains both the rapid growth
and the subsequent stagnation within the same general framework. It does this
by drawing on both demand and supply side elements. The fundamental change
on the supply side was the transition from a dual to a mature economy; this
transition and the associated decline in the share of investment in output led to
structural demand side problems.
The supply side appears in most accounts of Japanese stagnation, but typi-
cally in a very di¤erent way. It is commonly argued that the Japanese economy
su¤ers from structural problems of various kinds and that fundamental reforms
are needed. The latest OECD Economic Survey follows this line. There is a
need for "bold structural reforms" to "improve the business climate" (by, inter
alia, "promoting labor market exibility" and "revitalising venture capital in-
vestment"). Fiscal policy also needs to be addressed, and the "top scal priority
is reducing government debt" (OECD 2015, p. 5). The benets of these reforms
from a pure supply side perspective  assuming that there were no aggregate
demand problems  are not obvious, and some of the OECD recommendations
will have strong, adverse e¤ects on the demand side. Fiscal consolidation is the
obvious case in point but not the only one. Supply side reforms that increase
inequality will tend to raise the saving rate and reduce aggregate demand.15
The demand side has received attention, too. Demand side explanations
have focused on inadequate scal and monetary policies in combination with
15A disregard of aggregate demand can be found in many contributions. Rather then
reecting policy responses to weak demand, the Japanese case, according to Obstfeld (2013,
p. 2) illustrates how dangerous it can be to tolerate large public debt buildups.
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the slowdown of investment following the bubble period in the late eighties
(Krugman 1998). As far as they go, these explanations are in line with the
argument in this paper. But until recently at least, aggregate demand problems
have been seen as largely transitory, not as reections of a structural, long run
demand issue. This may be changing with the rediscovery of secular stagnation
by Summers and others.
In his presentation at an IMF conference Summers (2013) raised the prospect
of secular stagnation, not just for Japan but as a relevant concern for other ad-
vanced economies, including the US.16 Summers theoretical analysis was some-
what tentative, but the presentation still caused a stir. Summers (2015a) elab-
orates on the argument, suggesting that because of the zero bound on nominal
interest rates there is "no guarantee that the real rate will be low enough for full
employment (p. 61). Importantly, this state of a¤airs may not be short-lived
since equilibrium interest rates may be lower on a sustained basis (p. 62). He
concludes that "nding ways to increase the demand to spend, no matter how
counterintuitive, is likely to be an important part of the way forward" (p.65).
Summers also accepts, however, that scal policy may not be possible, given
that the government cannot indenitely expand its debt (Summers 2015b)
Krugman has been making similar points about the need for increased spend-
ing in his discussions of liquidity traps and the lessons from Japan (e.g. Krugman
2013a). Like Summers, he also sees high debt as a problem:
"Yes, the United States has a long-run budget problem. Dealing
with that problem is going to require, rst of all, sharply bending the
curve on Medicare costs; without that, nothing works. And second,
its going to require some combination of spending cuts and revenue
increases, amounting to at least 3 percent of GDP and probably
more, on a permanent basis." (Krugman 2010)
The nature of the long-run debt problem is not explained and there appears
to be no recognition that public debt does not need to expand indenitely. The
Summers and Krugman analysis presents a strong contrast to Reinhart-Rogo¤
claims about dramatic, negative e¤ects of debt on growth. But the break is
incomplete.
Part of the problem may stem from the lack of a clear theoretical framework
in Summerss analysis. The reference to equilibrium interest rates raises a
number of questions. The equilibrium interest rate may be well-dened in DSGE
models with Ramsey optimization. But secular stagnation nds no place in these
models and scal policy is ine¤ectual. Leaving the DSGE setting, scal policy
and the size of the public debt inuence aggregate demand. But as argued in
sections 4-5, the output capital ratio that is required for steady growth with full
employment  and thereby the interest rate that is required  will be contingent
on the scal parameters. Putting it di¤erently, assumptions must be made
16The dangers of secular stagnation has been emphasized by many (post-) Keynesians before
Summers intervention. Examples include Godley (1999), Wray (2000), Skott (2001) and
Palley (2002).
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about scal policy and the debt ratio in order for statements about equilibrium
interest rates to be meaningful.
Functional nance faces a similar question but approaches it di¤erently: in-
terest rates are chosen to achieve the desirable capital intensity (possibly taking
into account other criteria, including income distribution) and contingent on
this choice, scal policy is adjusted to maintain full employment. The result is
an endogenously determined long-run debt ratio.
If there were strong reasons to prefer a particular debt ratio, one could start
with a target for the debt ratio and let interest rates and the capital intensity do
the adjusting. Assuming that the output capital ratio (the choice of technique)
depends strongly on interest rate, the equilibrium interest rate could be dened
as the rate that is consistent with full employment and the target debt ratio.17
This may be Summerss implicit assumption. But if it is, the target debt ratio
needs to be specied, and it is not obvious that this target should be independent
of other parameters that a¤ect aggregate demand. Consider, for instance, a fall
in the natural growth rate. An exogenously specied target for the debt ratio
would imply that all the adjustment falls on the capital intensity. Assuming
a well-behaved production function, the capital intensity would need to rise,
even if this were to lead to dynamic ine¢ciency. Moreover, unlike functional
nance, a reliance on adjustments in capital intensity to maintain growth with
full employment comes up against all the problems highlighted by the capital
controversy.
7 Conclusion
Austerity policies have had devastating consequences for unemployment, poverty
and political instability. Some of the most dramatic examples come from the
Eurozone, and the analysis in this paper does not apply directly to individual
countries in a currency union. But it does apply to the Eurozone as whole. The
obsession with public debt and sound nance is tragic and unnecessary.
It is disturbing and deeply ironic that the main justication for these policies
has come in large part from crude correlations between debt and growth. It is
disturbing because simple correlations leave open the question of causation.
It is ironic because the advocacy has come from a profession that has been
preaching the Lucas critique and the impossibility of informed policy analysis
based on mere statistical correlation.18 It is doubly ironic because the theoretical
orthodoxy that emerged in response to the Lucas critique implies that, as a rst
approximation, public debt is a non-issue.
Another defense of sound nance comes from calculations that show the
unsustainability of large, permanent primary decits. These calculations are
17The sensitivity of the choice of technique to changes in interest rates becomes important
if one takes this approach. By contrast, functional nance operates equally well with Leontief
production function.
18See Skott (2014) for a discussion of the Lucas critique (which prompted the move towards
these models) and the implications of the critique.
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largely silly. There is no point in asking whether this or that arbitrary path of
primary decits is sustainable. Arbitrary paths generally do not produce good
results. No Keynesian economist advocates policies of this kind. Fiscal and
monetary policies are instruments. They should be designed to maintain (non-
inationary) full employment and a desirable trajectory for investment (and
thereby the capital output ratio). Market forces do not automatically ensure
these outcomes and there is need for aggregate demand policy.
The rediscovery of secular stagnation shows a growing recognition that ag-
gregate demand problems need not be short-lived. It remains to be seen whether
this recognition will lead mainstream macroeconomics to break with the Lucas
inspired research program and move away from models based on optimizing
representative households with innite horizons. As it is, Summers and most
other contributors to this literature seem reluctant to make that break. The
analysis therefore is left curiously atheoretical with ill-dened notions of equi-
librium interest rates as a centerpiece of the argument. The call for measures
to increase aggregate demand is in line with functional nance, however, and a
functional nance perspective has implications for public debt. In this paper I
have highlighted three of them. Low economic growth, rst, tends to produce
high debt. Reductions in government consumption, second, tend to raise the
debt in the long run. Increasing inequality, third, tends to raise the debt. The
model in this paper is exceedingly simple, but the same qualitative results can
be derived for a range of models.
Appendix A: Stability of the debt ratio
The consumption-capital ratio is given by
C
K
= c( + rb 
T
K
) + (1 + b)
and in steady growth with full employment we have
C
K
=       (n+ )
Putting these two equations together, the required tax ratio can be written
T
K
=  + rb 
1
c
[(1 + b) +  + n+    ] (12)
Plugging this tax ratio into the dynamic equation for the debt ratio, we get
_b = b(B^   n)
= b
rB +G  T
B
  nb
= (r   n)b+ 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c
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The coe¢cient on b on the right hand side of (12) is unambiguously negative
and it follows that
b! b =
(1  c)(   )    n  
nc+ 
(14)
Appendix B: Correlation between the long-run
values of the debt ratio and the tax rate
Assume that all income is taxed at the same rate t: Then,
T
K
= t( + rb) (15)
A stationary debt ratio requires that
_b = (r   n)b+   
T
K
= 0 (16)
Combining this condition with equation (15), we get
(r   n)b+    t( + rb) = 0 (17)
and, using (14), the long-run solution for the tax rate can be written
t =
n(        n  ) + (   )
r(        n  ) + (+ cn)  rc(   )
Both b and t are functions of (c; ; ; ; n; ). Consider an increase in the
marginal rate of consumption out of disposable income or wealth ( an increase
in c or ). The debt ratio b will fall (use (14)), but the e¤ect on t is ambiguous.
Total di¤erentiation of (17) gives
dt
db
=
r(1  t)  n
 + rb
(18)
From (17) it also follows that
b

[r(1  t)  n] = (t 


)
Hence,
r(1 


)  n = r(1  t)  n+ r(t 


)
= [r(1  t)  n](1 + r
b

) (19)
Combining (18) and (19), the reduced-form correlation between t and b following
a change in c or  can be written
dt
db
=
r(   )  n
( + rb)2
Thus, variations in the consumption parameters lead to a negative correlation
between the debt ratio and the tax rate if r(   ) < n.
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